LLC Fiduciaries: Where Has All the Good Faith Gone? by Wheeler, Scott Gordon
WHEELER FINAL 7/6/2011 4:54 PM 
 
1063 
LLC Fiduciaries: Where Has All the Good Faith 
Gone?* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Since its enactment in 1992, Delaware’s limited liability company 
(LLC) act has given “maximum effect to the principle of freedom of 
contract” and allowed for the restriction of fiduciary duties.1  A full 
decade later, when dealing with similar language in the limited 
partnership (LP) act, the Delaware Supreme Court acknowledged the 
ability of parties to restrict fiduciary duties but refused to go so far as to 
allow the complete waiver of those duties.2  The state legislature quickly 
rebuffed the Delaware Supreme Court with an amendment in 2004 that 
explicitly provided the right to parties to eliminate fiduciary duties, 
further codifying the desire by the legislature to move toward a contract-
based approach to LLC governance.3 
Delaware’s actions over the past decade are a microcosm of a larger 
debate.  Since the early 1990s, three fundamental issues regarding the 
role of fiduciary duties in unincorporated entities have occupied 
considerable mind space: (1) the extent to which such entities allow 
fiduciary duties to be waived, (2) the default rules that apply in the 
absence of waiver, and (3) the requirements for effective waiver.4  The 
rapid succession of uniform acts for unincorporated entities has 
perpetuated this discussion, and those uniform acts further serve as a 
national track record of the trend away from the fiduciary-based  
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 1. See Delaware Limited Liability Company Act, 68 Del. Laws 1329, 1355 (1992) (current 
version at DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-1101(b)–(c) (West Supp. 2011)). 
 2. See Gotham Partners v. Hallwood Realty Partners, 817 A.2d 160, 167–68 (Del. 2002). 
 3. See Act effective Aug. 1, 2004, 74 Del. Laws 612, 613 (2004) (current version at DEL. 
CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-1101(c) (West Supp. 2011)). 
 4. See infra Part II. 
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approach—envisioned for much of the twentieth century—toward a 
contract-based approach.5 
Despite the case law and legislative action of the last twenty years, 
questions still remain.  The recent 2004 amendment closes the door on 
the question of whether fiduciary duties may be entirely eliminated in 
LLCs,6 but a string of recent Delaware Court of Chancery decisions has 
been inconsistent on Delaware’s approach to default rules and the 
requirements for effective waiver.7  This uncertainty raises questions for 
states that follow Delaware’s lead in business law and is nowhere more 
apparent than in Kansas, a state that uses a pre-2004 version of the 
Delaware statute.8  The question of the elimination of fiduciary duties 
may have been answered in Delaware, but it has not yet been addressed 
in Kansas.9 
This Comment does not purport to evaluate the larger national trend.  
That debate continues to be vibrant and is carried out by far more 
experienced commentators.10  This Comment instead focuses narrowly 
on the approach of Delaware and Kansas by first addressing the statute 
and then examining how Delaware and Kansas courts can develop a 
cohesive approach within the framework those states’ statutes envision. 
This Comment begins with a brief observation of the history of 
fiduciary duties.  It then examines the debate in Delaware and how it has 
played out in legislative acts, cases, and commentaries.  But this 
Comment primarily builds upon the status of the law in Kansas.  
Alternative approaches will be examined and assessed according to their 
permissibility under the current Kansas statute.  An analysis of the 1999 
Kansas act reveals a mandate that requires the enforcement of complete 
                                                     
 5. See generally Rutheford B. Campbell, Jr., The “New” Fiduciary Standards Under the 
Revised Uniform Limited Liability Company Act: More Bottom Bumping From NCCUSL, 61 ME. L. 
REV. 27 (2009) (discussing fiduciary duties in the Revised Uniform Limited Liability Company 
Act); Larry E. Ribstein, Fiduciary Duties and Limited Partnership Agreements, 37 SUFFOLK U. L. 
REV. 927 (2004) (discussing fiduciary duties in the Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act); 
Allan W. Vestal, Fundamental Contractarian Error in the Revised Uniform Partnership Act of 1992, 
73 B.U. L. REV. 523 (1993) (discussing fiduciary duties in the Revised Uniform Partnership Act). 
 6. See 74 Del. Laws at 613. 
 7. See infra Part II.B. 
 8. Compare KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-76,134(c)(2) (2007) (allowing fiduciary duties to be 
“expanded or restricted”), with DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-1101(c) (West Supp. 2011) (allowing 
fiduciary duties to be “expanded or restricted or eliminated”). 
 9. See infra Part II.C. 
 10. The debate surrounding the promulgation of RUPA is one such example of this.  See, e.g., 
Larry E. Ribstein, The Revised Uniform Partnership Act: Not Ready for Prime Time, 49 BUS. LAW. 
45, 57–61 (1993); Vestal, supra note 5, at 556–63. 
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waivers of fiduciary duties.11  This conclusion places Kansas in roughly 
the same position as Delaware—faced with addressing the default rules 
and standards for effective waiver of those rules.12  While aspects of this 
Comment will narrowly address the unique position of Kansas, the 
majority of its analysis is equally applicable to the law in Delaware or 
states using the Delaware LLC act as a model. 
An analysis of both Kansas and Delaware statutes reveals that, 
despite the ability to waive, default fiduciary duties were intended to 
apply when deemed appropriate under common law.13  The Kansas and 
Delaware statutes are mute on the issue of the requirements for sufficient 
waiver,14 but significant policy objectives favor requiring explicit waiver. 
II. BACKGROUND 
The emergence of LLCs in the 1980s and 1990s15 coincided with the 
larger discussion of the role of fiduciary duties in unincorporated 
entities.16  Delaware’s LLC act embraced a contract-based approach at its 
inception,17 but LLCs were still largely assumed to inherit the duties that 
historically governed like relationships.18  Recent Delaware cases 
obfuscate the issue of fiduciary duties in LLCs, leaving states that follow 
Delaware’s lead in business law without a clear guide.19 
                                                     
 11. See infra Part III.A.1. 
 12. See infra Parts II.B–C, III.A. 
 13. See infra Part III.B.1. 
 14. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-1101 (West Supp. 2011); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-76,134 
(2007). 
 15. The first U.S. jurisdiction to adopt an LLC act was Wyoming in 1977.  Larry E. Ribstein, 
LLCs: Is the Future Here? A History & Prognosis, BUS. L. TODAY, Nov.–Dec. 2003, at 10, 11.  By 
1996, every state had enacted an LLC act.  Id. at 12. 
 16. See generally Ribstein, supra note 5 (discussing fiduciary duties in limited partnerships); 
Vestal, supra note 5 (discussing fiduciary duties in partnerships). 
 17. Delaware Limited Liability Company Act, 68 Del. Laws 1329, 1355 (1992) (current version 
at DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-1101(b)). 
 18. See Larry E. Ribstein, Litigating in LLCs, 64 BUS. LAW. 739, 739 (2009) (“The rapid 
development of limited liability companies (‘LLCs’) has caused numerous growing pains as courts 
and legislatures have searched for appropriate sources from which to draw the rules for this new 
business form.  Not surprisingly, legislators and courts frequently apply rules from existing business 
entities.”); Allan Walker Vestal, “. . . Drawing Near the Fastness?”—The Failed United States 
Experiment in Unincorporated Business Entity Reform, 26 J. CORP. L. 1019, 1021 (2001) (“In brief, 
[the Uniform Limited Liability Company Act] provides nonmanaging members the comprehensive 
information rights of partners, with the narrow fiduciary obligations of noncontrolling 
shareholders.”). 
 19. See infra Part II.B.1. 
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A. Fiduciary Duties Before the Emergence of LLCs 
Because LLCs borrowed characteristics from existing entity types, 
courts have understandably sought to adapt existing jurisprudence to the 
LLC context.20  LLCs were often imbued with the same traditional 
fiduciary duties that permeated the law of partnerships and 
corporations,21 and thus a discussion of fiduciary duties in the LLC 
context requires an analysis of the jurisprudence from which courts drew 
inspiration. 
Two aspects of fiduciary duties are specifically pertinent to the 
current analysis: (1) the status of fiduciary duties as default rules and (2) 
the waivability of those rules.  Due to the enactment of Delaware’s first 
LLC act in 1992, this discussion largely provides a snapshot of fiduciary 
duties—and the debate surrounding them—during that time. 
1. Fiduciary Duties in Partnerships 
Then-Chief Judge Cardozo’s opinion in Meinhard v. Salmon22 is an 
early and oft-cited example of fiduciary duties in business organizations.  
The opinion is instructive regarding the twentieth century judiciary’s 
approach to fiduciary duties. 
Uncompromising rigidity has been the attitude of courts of equity when 
petitioned to undermine the rule of undivided loyalty by the 
“disintegrating erosion” of particular exceptions.  Only thus has the 
level of conduct for fiduciaries been kept at a level higher than that 
trodden by the crowd.  It will not consciously be lowered by any 
judgment of this court.23 
Despite Cardozo’s absolute declaration as to the “uncompromising 
rigidity” of the courts,24 there is some debate over the extent to which 
fiduciary duties were in fact waivable in the partnership context 
throughout the twentieth century.25  This historical debate was a feature 
of the discussion that surrounded the drafting and promulgation of the 
                                                     
 20. See Ribstein, supra note 18, at 739; Vestal, supra note 18, at 1021. 
 21. See Ribstein, supra note 18, at 739; Vestal, supra note 18, at 1021. 
 22. 164 N.E. 545 (N.Y. 1928). 
 23. Id. at 546 (citations omitted). 
 24. Id. 
 25. See, e.g., Ribstein, supra note 10, at 60–61; Vestal, supra note 5, at 556–63. 
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Revised Uniform Partnership Act (RUPA) in 1992,26 coinciding with the 
enactment of Delaware’s first LLC act in the same year.27 
In 1993, Professor Allan Vestal argued that, before RUPA, common 
law placed significant limitations on the modification of fiduciary 
duties.28  “Under existing common law, the general rule is that the duty 
of loyalty is not contractually modifiable, but it can be specifically 
waived.  One party may release the obligation of another party whose 
actions would otherwise violate the duty of loyalty, but only after 
sufficiently specific disclosure . . . .”29  This analysis conflicts with 
Professor Larry Ribstein’s contention that the “[m]andatory fiduciary 
duties [embraced in RUPA] change decades of prior law under the 
[original Uniform Partnership Act].”30  Ribstein did acknowledge, 
however, that “[a]lthough the UPA did not explicitly permit advance 
contracting around many of its default rules, it has been so interpreted.”31 
The debate surrounding the extent that fiduciary duties have 
historically been waivable is largely superseded by the express allowance 
of waivers in Delaware’s LLC, LP, and partnership acts.32  It is important 
to note, however, there is broad consensus that fiduciary duties, absent 
waiver, apply by default in the partnership context.33 
2. Fiduciary Duties in Corporations 
In a 1985 case, the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the 
longstanding precedent that directors, when acting as managers, “are 
                                                     
 26. See, e.g., Ribstein, supra note 10, at 57–61; Vestal, supra note 5, at 556–63. 
 27. 1 LARRY E. RIBSTEIN & ROBERT R. KEATINGE, RIBSTEIN & KEATINGE ON LIMITED 
LIABILITY COMPANIES § 1:2 (2d ed. 2004). 
 28. See Vestal, supra note 5, at 557. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Ribstein, supra note 10, at 57. 
 31. Larry E. Ribstein, Changing Statutory Forms, 1 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 11, 29 
n.109 (1997). 
 32. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §§ 15-103(f), 17-1101(c), 18-1101(c) (West Supp. 2011); see 
also infra Part III.B.1. 
 33. While Ribstein asserts that fiduciary duties were not mandatory under UPA, see Ribstein, 
supra note 10, at 57, he did acknowledge the existence of default, albeit narrowly defined, fiduciary 
duties.  See Larry E. Ribstein, Are Partners Fiduciaries?, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 209, 212.  “[D]efault 
fiduciary duties should be confined to relationships that involve the contractual delegation of broad 
power over one’s property.”  Id. at 212.  The scope of this Comment does not allow for an in-depth 
analysis of what circumstances might trigger default fiduciary duties.  For such a discussion, see 
generally id.  Further, this Comment does not suggest a change to common law fiduciary duties but 
merely proposes that when default fiduciary duties are appropriate under common law, they should 
be applied unless explicitly waived.  See infra Part III.B.  This is the approach enunciated in the 
Kansas and Delaware statutes.  See infra Part III.B. 
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charged with an unyielding fiduciary duty to the corporation and its 
shareholders.”34  Delaware’s corporate statute now provides that an 
exculpation clause can be inserted into a corporation’s certificate of 
incorporation, limiting or eliminating the personal liability of a 
corporation’s director for a breach of fiduciary duty.35  That exculpation 
clause, however, is subject to several broad exceptions; importantly, an 
exculpation clause would not limit or eliminate a director’s personal 
liability for breach of the duty of loyalty, intentional or knowingly 
unlawful misconduct, or a transaction from which the director derived a 
personal benefit.36  These exceptions may be understood as maintaining a 
“mandatory core” of fiduciary duties, which may not be waived by 
agreement.  Further, the statute does not propose to affect the default 
rules; traditional fiduciary duties apply if the certificate of incorporation 
includes no exculpation clause.37  In a 2005 speech, Delaware Vice 
Chancellor Leo E. Strine reaffirmed the role of common law fiduciary 
duties, stating: 
the continued importance of the common law of corporations is not the 
result of happenstance, but reflects a policy choice made by the 
Delaware General Assembly.  That choice deliberately deploys 
Delaware’s judiciary to guarantee the integrity of our corporate law 
through the articulation of common law principles of equitable 
behavior for corporate fiduciaries.38 
                                                     
 34. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985), overruled on other grounds by 
Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695 (Del. 2009); see also Loft, Inc. v. Guth, 2 A.2d 225 (Del. Ch. 
1938) (enforcing a similar duty). 
 35. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7). 
 36. See id.  That provision allows a corporation’s certificate of incorporation to include 
[a] provision eliminating or limiting the personal liability of a director to the corporation 
or its stockholders for monetary damages for breach of fiduciary duty as a director, 
provided that such provision shall not eliminate or limit the liability of a director: (i) For 
any breach of the director’s duty of loyalty to the corporation or its stockholders; (ii) for 
acts or omissions not in good faith or which involve intentional misconduct or a knowing 
violation of law; (iii) [unlawful payment of dividend or unlawful stock purchase or 
redemption]; or (iv) for any transaction from which the director derived an improper 
personal benefit. 
Id.; see also In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 825 A.2d 275 (Del. Ch. 2003) (involving a 
corporate director whose behavior fell outside the company’s exculpation clause). 
 37. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7). 
 38. Myron T. Steele, Judicial Scrutiny of Fiduciary Duties in Delaware Limited Partnerships 
and Limited Liability Companies, 32 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 6 (2007) (quoting Leo E. Strine, Vice 
Chancellor, Del. Court of Chancery, If Corporate Action Is Lawful, Presumably There Are 
Circumstances in Which It’s Equitable to Take That Action: The Important Corollary to the Rule of 
Schnell v. Chris-Craft 4, Regent’s Lecture at the UCLA School of Law (Mar. 31, 2005)). 
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B. The Debate in Delaware 
“The two major paradigms of LLC governance are the fiduciary-
based . . . approach borrowed from corporation and partnership law and 
the freedom of contract empowering elimination/full indemnification 
approach.”39  The former, sometimes described as a status-based 
approach, contends that fiduciaries owe a duty to the company as a result 
of their status as a fiduciary.40  The latter approach, often described as a 
contract-based approach, proposes that the duties owed are derived from 
the LLC agreement.41 
Since its inception, Delaware’s LLC act has affirmed the policy goal 
of giving “maximum effect to the principle of freedom of contract.”42  As 
such, the statute embraces the contract-based approach.  The statute also 
provides that “[t]he rule that statutes in derogation of the common law 
are to be strictly construed shall have no application to this chapter.”43  
Despite its clear policy objective and rules of interpretation, Delaware 
courts were not uniformly eager to give effect to waivers of fiduciary 
duties. 
In Gotham Partners v. Hallwood Realty Partners, the Delaware 
Court of Chancery interpreted similar language in the state’s limited 
partnership statute as allowing for the elimination of fiduciary duties 
entirely.44  The Delaware Supreme Court was not so bold.45  On appeal, 
the court was reluctant to discard decades of fiduciary duty jurisprudence 
and chose to interpret the statute narrowly—in contravention of the clear 
rules of interpretation laid out in the statute.46  The court acknowledged 
that the statute clearly allowed for the “expansion and restriction” of 
fiduciary duties, but it rejected the contention that the statute allowed 
such duties to be eliminated entirely.47 
                                                     
 39. Larry A. DiMatteo, Policing Limited Liability Companies Under Contract Law, 46 AM. 
BUS. L.J. 279, 280 (2009). 
 40. See id. at 281; Sandra K. Miller, What Fiduciary Duties Should Apply to the LLC Manager 
After More than a Decade of Experimentation?, 32 J. CORP. L. 565, 581 (2007). 
 41. See DiMatteo, supra note 39, at 282–84; Miller, supra note 40, at 580–81. 
 42. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-1101(b). 
 43. Id. § 18-1101(a). 
 44. 817 A.2d 160, 167 (Del. 2002) (quoting the lower court’s unpublished opinion which 
observed that the statute allowed for elimination of fiduciary duties). 
 45. See id. at 168 (“There is no mention in [the statute] . . . that a limited partnership agreement 
may eliminate the fiduciary duties or liabilities of a general partner.”). 
 46. See id. at 167–68; see also Steele, supra note 38, at 21. 
 47. Gotham, 817 A.2d at 167–68. 
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The Delaware legislature did not hesitate in rebuking the Supreme 
Court.  In 2004, it amended the statute to expressly allow for the 
elimination of fiduciary duties.48  The legislature went even further, 
emphasizing that the only unwaivable duties would be those arising 
under the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.49  That 
covenant, commandeered from contract law, exists to protect the 
“reasonable expectations” of contracting parties.50  Some have argued 
that the covenant’s incorporation into the statute further expresses the 
legislature’s intent to abandon the status-based fiduciary duties of 
common law and replace them with a solely contract-based set of 
duties.51  In fact, the pure contractarian approach—an approach that 
applies no fiduciary duties by default—would suggest that the sole 
default protection should be that provided for by the covenant.52  
However, as discussed later, the 2004 amendment should be taken for 
what it is—an intent to allow for the elimination of fiduciary duties.  
Commentators who suggest that fiduciary duties should not apply by 
default do not find support for that assertion in the statute itself.53 
1. Current Questions and Recent Cases 
Even with the large amount of business law litigation that Delaware 
sees each year, two important questions have yet to be answered since 
the 2004 amendment.  First, what default rules apply when the LLC 
agreement is silent?  And second, what is required to eliminate 
traditional fiduciary duties entirely? 
                                                     
 48. See Act effective Aug. 1, 2004, 74 Del. Laws 589, 590–91 (2004) (current version at DEL. 
CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 17-1101(d)–(f)) (addressing limited partnerships); Act effective Aug. 1, 2004, 74 
Del. Laws 612, 613–14 (2004) (current version at DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-1101(c)–(e)) 
(addressing limited liability companies); see also Steele, supra note 38, at 13. 
 49. 74 Del. Laws at 590–91, 613–14. 
 50. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Pressman, 679 A.2d 436, 442–44 (Del. 1996). 
 51. See, e.g., Steele, supra note 38, at 29 (advocating for a contractually based governance 
scheme). 
 52. See Myron T. Steele, Freedom of Contract and Default Contractual Duties in Delaware 
Limited Partnerships and Limited Liability Companies, 46 AM. BUS. L.J. 221, 233 (2009) 
(“Delaware courts should eschew their addiction to default fiduciary duties and instead adopt a 
policy of no default fiduciary duty.”). 
 53. See infra Part III.B. 
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a. Default Rules When the LLC Agreement Is Silent 
One possible approach is to apply traditional fiduciary duties when 
the LLC agreement contains no waiver.  In Kelly v. Blum, the Delaware 
Court of Chancery appeared to take this approach; the court analogized 
Kelly’s facts to the corporate context.54 
“[I]n the absence of provisions in the LLC agreement explicitly 
disclaiming the applicability of default principles of fiduciary duty,” 
controlling members in a manager-managed LLC owe minority 
members “the traditional fiduciary duties” that controlling shareholders 
owe minority shareholders. . . . 
. . . . 
Because the [LLC agreement was] silent as to what duties controlling 
members owe minority members, [the court found] that [the defendant] 
owed [the plaintiff] traditional fiduciary duties . . . .55 
Kelly holds that fiduciary duties are applicable when the LLC agreement 
is silent,56 but there is a supplementary point to be gleaned from the 
decision.  The LLC agreement in Kelly was silent on the topic of 
fiduciary duties owed by members, but it explicitly restricted the 
fiduciary duties owed by managers.57  This suggests that fiduciary duties 
not only serve as default rules when the LLC agreement is silent but 
remain in place as gap-fillers when the LLC agreement purports to edit 
the fiduciary duties of some parties but not others. 
The approach of the court in Kelly, which assumes default fiduciary 
duties, has been met with some criticism.58 
[If the] reference to “restricted or eliminated by provisions in the 
partnership agreement,” was not clear enough, the quintessential 
contract reference, “provided that the partnership agreement may not 
eliminate the implied contractual covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing,” should make the legislature’s intent abundantly clear.  This 
                                                     
 54. No. 4516-VCP, 2010 WL 629850, at *11–12 (Del. Ch. Feb. 24, 2010). 
 55. Id. (citations omitted) (quoting Bay Ctr. Apartments Owner, LLC v. Emery Bay PKI, LLC, 
No. 3658-VCS, 2009 WL 1124451, at *8 n.33 (Del. Ch. Apr. 20, 2009)). 
 56. See id. 
 57. See id. at *12–13; see also Larry E. Ribstein, The Persistent Fiduciary Duty Minefield in 
LLCs, IDEOBLOG (Feb. 26, 2010, 8:28 AM), http://busmovie.typepad.com/ideoblog/2010/02/the-
persistent-fiduciary-duty-minefield-in-llcs.html. 
 58. See Steele, supra note 38, at 14. 
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language, carefully borrowed from contract law, as distinguished from 
corporate law, to set the parameters of action deemed to be in “good 
faith,” must be read as an affirmation that . . . [traditional fiduciary 
duties] is not the lens through which the action of parties to a limited 
partnership or limited liability company agreement will be viewed.59 
This language, written by Chief Justice Myron Steele in 2007, suggests 
that there is at least some support on the Delaware Supreme Court to 
abandon fiduciary duties as default rules when analyzing LLC 
agreements.60 
Support can also be found in a recent string of Court of Chancery 
cases.  In these cases, the court has refused to impose default fiduciary 
duties.61  Such opinions are facially inconsistent with Kelly, but they 
could conceivably be explained by the nature of the relationship between 
the defendant and the LLC.62  Ribstein argues that “default fiduciary 
duties should be confined to relationships that involve the contractual 
delegation of broad power over one’s property.”63  This theory suggests 
members do not, simply by virtue of being members, have fiduciary 
duties; it is when a member is delegated discretionary, managerial power 
that fiduciary duties exist.64  “[A]lthough [such an understanding] may 
seem to differ radically from courts’ broad view of fiduciary duties, in 
fact a careful analysis of how courts have applied fiduciary duties shows 
that the law is largely consistent with [this] narrow view.”65  It is possible 
that the Court of Chancery would have assumed default fiduciary duties  
                                                     
 59. Id. (quoting DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 17-1101 (2004) (using similar language to the LLC 
statute)). 
 60. See id.; see also Francis G.X. Pileggi, Fiduciary Duties in Delaware LPs and LLCs, DEL. 
CORP. AND COM. LITIG. BLOG (Mar. 14, 2007), http://www.delawarelitigation.com/2007/03/ 
articles/commentary/fiduciary-duties-in-delaware-lps-and-llcs/.  A recent Delaware case did see 
Justice Steele apply fiduciary duties by default.  See William Penn P’ship v. Saliba, No. 362, 2010, 
2011 WL 440615, at *5 (Del. Feb. 9, 2011).  However, Saliba was not an en banc review, and the 
existence of fiduciary duties was not challenged.  See id. (“The parties here agree that managers of a 
Delaware limited liability company owe traditional fiduciary duties of loyalty and care to the 
members of the LLC . . . .”). 
 61. See, e.g., Kuroda v. SPJS Holdings, 971 A.2d 872 (Del. Ch. 2009); Fisk Ventures v. Segal, 
No. 3017-CC, 2008 WL 1961156 (Del. Ch. May 7, 2008). 
 62. Cf. Larry Ribstein, More on Getting Rid of LLC Fiduciary Duties, TRUTH ON THE MARKET 
(Aug. 12, 2010), http://truthonthemarket.com/2010/08/12/more-on-getting-rid-of-llc-fiduciary-
duties/ (reconciling two seemingly inconsistent cases by examining the difference in managerial 
power between the defendants). 
 63. Ribstein, supra note 33, at 212. 
 64. Cf. id. at 209 (“[P]artners, as such, are not fiduciaries because they do not delegate open-
ended control to their co-partners.”). 
 65. Id. at 213. 
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had the defendants in these cases been a manager or member acting in a 
managerial capacity.66 
However, Ribstein’s theory might not wholly account for the 
seemingly schizophrenic nature of Court of Chancery opinions.  In Fisk 
Ventures v. Segal, the court stated: “In the context of limited liability 
companies, which are creatures not of the state but of contract, those 
duties or obligations must be found in the LLC Agreement or some other 
contract.”67  It might be assumed that this decisive, far-reaching 
statement could not still be considered the approach of the court 
following the later Kelly decision, but this exact quote has been used to 
support post-Kelly Court of Chancery decisions.68  As the Court of 
Chancery grapples with the question of what default rules apply, states 
that follow the Delaware model are left without a guide. 
b. The Elimination of Fiduciary Duties 
The Delaware Court of Chancery has also examined LLC fiduciary 
duties when the LLC agreement speaks to the duties.  The Court of 
Chancery has stated that, consistent with Delaware’s LLC act, fiduciary 
duties may be eliminated completely.69  The requirements of waiver, 
however, have yet to be defined.  The most recent and far-reaching case 
on the topic is the unpublished Related Westpac LLC v. JER Snowmass 
LLC.70  In Related Westpac, the Court of Chancery refused to apply 
fiduciary duties because such duties were inconsistent with the terms of 
the LLC agreement.71  The plaintiff in Related Westpac claimed that the 
defendant had breached his fiduciary duties when he unreasonably 
refused a capital call.72  The LLC agreement stated that capital calls 
could not be “‘unreasonably withheld or delayed, except with respect to 
                                                     
 66. Id. 
 67. 2008 WL 1961156, at *8 (emphasis added); see also Francis G.X. Pileggi, Chancery Gives 
Victory to “Freedom of Contract” Regarding Fiduciary Duties in LLC Agreement, DEL. CORP. & 
COM. LITIG. BLOG (May 9, 2008), http://www.delawarelitigation.com/2008/05/articles/ 
chancerycourt-updates/chancery-gives-victory-to-freedom-of-contract-regarding-fiduciary-duties-in-
llc-agreement/. 
 68. See, e.g., Related Westpac LLC v. JER Snowmass LLC, No. 5001-VCS, 2010 WL 
2929708, at *6 n.30 (Del. Ch. July 23, 2010). 
 69. See, e.g., Fisk, 2008 WL 1961156, at *11. 
 70. 2010 WL 2929708; see also Francis G.X. Pileggi, Chancery Refuses to Impose Fiduciary 
Duties on Parties to LLC Agreement, DEL. CORP. AND COM. LITIG. BLOG (Aug. 9, 2010), 
http://www.delawarelitigation.com/2010/08/articles/chancery-court-updates/chancery-refuses-to-imp 
ose-fiduciary-duties-on-parties-to-llc-agreement/. 
 71. 2010 WL 2929708, at *8. 
 72. Id. at *1–3. 
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[the defendant].’”73  While this provision explicitly excludes the 
defendant from any reasonableness standard in refusing the capital call 
(implying that he may act unreasonably), the LLC agreement included 
no explicit waiver of fiduciary duties.74 
When a fiduciary duty claim is plainly inconsistent with the contractual 
bargain struck by parties to an LLC or other alternative entity 
agreement, the fiduciary duty claim must fall, otherwise “the primacy 
of contract law over fiduciary law in matters involving . . . contractual 
rights and obligations [would be undermined].”75 
This precedent is somewhat clouded by the fact that, other than a 
handful of rights to approve or veto a few “material actions,” the 
defendant was largely a nonmanaging, passive investor.76  Under 
Ribstein’s managerial theory of fiduciary duties, it is questionable 
whether the defendant would have owed fiduciary duties absent the 
agreement provision relied upon by the court.77  Had the defendant been 
a manager delegated with broad discretionary power, the court might not 
have been so cavalier in discarding fiduciary duties.78  The Delaware 
Court of Chancery has not yet extended this precedent to a case where 
the defendant exercises managerial power; thus it is unclear whether 
terms merely inconsistent with traditional fiduciary duties can be used to 
exempt a manager or managing member.  The standard required for an 
effective waiver of fiduciary duties remains an open question. 
2. Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing 
Still, even if the fiduciary duties can be waived, some unwaivable 
protection remains—the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.  
The covenant is not a new creation,79 but its 2004 incorporation into 
Delaware’s LLC act adopted the covenant in a new context.  The 
covenant’s new role in policing LLCs has yet to be sufficiently tested.  
However, as the one unwaivable principle established in the Delaware 
                                                     
 73. Id. at *3. 
 74. Id. at *2 (outlining the LLC agreement’s terms). 
 75. Id. at *8 (quoting Madison Realty Partners 7, LLC v. Ag ISA, LLC, No. 18094, 2001 WL 
406268, at *6 (Del. Ch. Apr. 17, 2001)). 
 76. Id. at *2 (outlining the defendant’s obligations in the LLC agreement). 
 77. See supra notes 63–66 and accompanying text. 
 78. See supra notes 63–66 and accompanying text. 
 79. See Steele, supra note 38, at 16–20 (discussing Delaware jurisprudence involving the 
covenant). 
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LLC act,80 the covenant may stand as the sole source of protection in 
governing many LLC agreements. 
The Second Restatement of Contracts informs us that “[e]very 
contract imposes upon each party a duty of good faith and fair dealing in 
its performance and its enforcement.”81  The Restatement further 
discusses the concept of good faith in its comments.82 
Good faith performance or enforcement of a contract emphasizes 
faithfulness to an agreed common purpose and consistency with the 
justified expectations of the other party; it excludes a variety of types of 
conduct characterized as involving “bad faith” because they violate 
community standards of decency, fairness or reasonableness.  The 
appropriate remedy for a breach of the duty of good faith also varies 
with the circumstances.83 
The Restatement’s comments further describe good faith in the 
contractual contexts of purchasing, negotiation, and performance.84  The 
illustrations provided in the Restatement, however, mostly describe 
contracts for the sale of goods and services, insurance contracts, and 
lease contracts.85  This is unsurprising.  When the Second Restatement 
was promulgated, LLCs had yet to be invented and existing forms of 
business organizations were not thought of in contractual terms.86 
Before the 2004 amendment, the covenant saw application in 
contractual disputes between employers and employees.87  In these cases, 
the Delaware Supreme Court identified the purpose of the covenant as 
promoting “the spirit of the agreement and [protecting] against one side 
using underhanded tactics to deny the other side the fruits of the parties’ 
bargain.”88  More tangibly, the covenant was described as protecting the 
“reasonable expectations” of the parties at the time the contract was 
formed.89 
                                                     
 80. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-1101(c) (West Supp. 2011). 
 81. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1981). 
 82. Id. § 205 cmt. a. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. § 205 cmts. b–d. 
 85. See id. § 205 ills. 1–7. 
 86. See Vestal, supra note 5, at 523–24 (discussing the fiduciary-based worldview that had 
existed in Uniform Partnership Act and the common law of partners prior to the 1990s). 
 87. See, e.g., E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Pressman, 679 A.2d 436, 442–44 (Del. 1996). 
 88. Kelly v. McKesson HBOC, Inc., No. 99C-09-265WCC, 2002 WL 88939, at *10 (Del. 
Super. Ct. Jan. 17, 2002). 
 89. Pressman, 679 A.2d at 443. 
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Recent Delaware precedent indicates that the implied covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing offers far less protection than its 
unbecomingly ostentatious moniker would suggest.  Delaware courts 
have recently applied—or, more accurately, refused to apply—the 
covenant in the context of LLCs.  In Kuroda v. SPJS Holdings, the Court 
of Chancery rejected a claim based on the covenant, acknowledging that 
“[c]onsistent with its narrow purpose, the implied covenant is only rarely 
invoked successfully.”90  In Nemec v. Shrader, the Delaware Supreme 
Court discussed the evidentiary standard of the covenant, citing earlier 
precedent in a footnote: “‘this Court has recognized the occasional 
necessity of implying such terms in an agreement so as to honor the 
parties’ reasonable expectations.  But those cases should be rare and fact-
intensive, turning on issues of compelling fairness.’”91  These cases, 
while sparse and narrow to their individual facts, provide some insight 
into how the covenant might govern disputes in Delaware LLCs.  The 
narrow purpose that Delaware courts have envisioned, along with the 
lofty standard that must be met for a claim based on the covenant to 
succeed, speak dramatically to the efficacy of invoking the covenant; in 
none of the cases has a claim based on the covenant succeeded.92 
C. The Law in Kansas 
Kansas was ahead of the curve in the adoption of its LLC act.  In 
1990, Kansas was one of a mere four states to allow the formation of 
LLCs.93  Despite this early adoption, however, Kansas has, for the last 
twenty years, consciously followed Delaware’s lead, adopting versions 
of Delaware statutes for its business organization acts.94  The Kansas 
judiciary has also made explicit the persuasiveness of Delaware court 
decisions in interpreting those statutes.95 
                                                     
 90. 971 A.2d 872, 888 (Del. Ch. 2009). 
 91. 991 A.2d 1120, 1125 n.16 (Del. 2010) (quoting Cincinnati SMSA Ltd. v. Cincinnati Bell 
Cellular Sys. Co., 708 A.2d 989, 992 (Del. 1998)). 
 92. See Nemec, 991 A.2d at 1125; Related Westpac LLC v. JER Snowmass LLC, No. 5001-
VCS, 2010 WL 2929708, at *6 (Del. Ch. July 23, 2010); Kuroda, 971 A.2d at 888; Fisk Ventures v. 
Segal, No. 3017-CC, 2008 WL 1961156, at *10–11 (Del. Ch. May 7, 2008). 
 93. See Robert R. Keatinge et al., The Limited Liability Company: A Study of the Emerging 
Entity, 47 BUS. LAW. 375, 384 (1992). 
 94. Edwin W. Hecker, Jr., Fiduciary Duties in Business Entities, 54 U. KAN. L. REV. 975, 975, 
1006–07, 1015–18 (2006) (discussing Delaware’s legislation as a model and addressing Kansas’s 
business organization statutes in light of Delaware precedent). 
 95. See id. at 975. 
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But recent Delaware decisions do little to provide a consistent, 
comprehensive framework for the application of fiduciary duties in the 
LLC context.96  This uncertainty is further compounded by a failure to 
update the Kansas LLC act since 1999.97  As such, Kansas is working 
with a pre-2004 version of the Delaware statute that differs from 
Delaware’s current statute.98  The most important difference is that while 
the Kansas statute does allow for fiduciary duties to be “expanded or 
restricted,” it does not explicitly allow for their elimination.99  While 
Delaware’s 2004 amendment clearly expresses an intent to allow 
complete waivers of fiduciary duties,100 the same cannot be said of the 
Kansas legislature’s inaction.  This disparity may create some confusion 
for Kansas courts.  However, as will be discussed, the pre-2004 version 
of the statute provides enough evidence to indicate approval of the 
elimination of fiduciary duties in LLCs.101 
While Kansas courts have not settled the issue of whether LLCs can 
eliminate fiduciary duties, some insight can be gained from other 
fiduciary duty cases.  A recent Kansas case involving fiduciary duties in 
unincorporated entities was Welch v. Via Christi Health Partners.102  In 
Via Christi, the defendant was a majority limited partner and sole general 
partner in a limited partnership.103  The defendant unilaterally amended 
the entity’s LP agreement to allow for merger without the approval of the 
minority limited partners.104  Subsequently, the defendant approved a 
merger with an LLC in which the defendant had a majority stake.105  The 
Via Christi opinion assumes that fiduciary duties did apply to the 
defendant as controlling limited partner.106  However, the Kansas 
Supreme Court ruled that the self-dealing involved in the transaction was 
insufficient on its own to create any presumption that would have shifted 
                                                     
 96. See supra Part II.B. 
 97. The current version of the Kansas LLC act was enacted in 1999 and entered into force in 
2000.  See Kansas Revised Limited Liability Company Act, 1999 Kan. Sess. Laws 701, 701–56 
(current version at KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 17-7662 to -76,142 (2007 & Supp. 2010)). 
 98. Compare DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-1101 (West 2006 & Supp. 2011), with KAN. STAT. 
ANN. § 17-76,134 (2007). 
 99. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-76,134(c)(2).  The Kansas statute also omits a reference to the 
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.  See id. at § 17-76,134(c).  However, its omission is 
unlikely to have a significant practical impact.  See infra note 148. 
 100. See supra Part II.B. 
 101. See infra Part III.A. 
 102. 133 P.3d 122 (Kan. 2006). 
 103. Id. at 125. 
 104. Id. at 125–26. 
 105. Id. at 126. 
 106. See id. at 136. 
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the burden to the defendant.107  This restrictive approach favors the 
enforcement of entity agreements and thus could serve as insight into 
how the court might treat an LLC agreement containing a fiduciary duty 
waiver. 
D. Alternative Approaches 
Still, Delaware’s approach is not the only option available for 
Kansas.  Three main alternatives to the Delaware approach have been 
proposed: (1) the approach envisioned in Revised Uniform Limited 
Liability Company Act (RULLCA), (2) the mandatory core approach, 
and (3) an approach that incorporates contract law-based protections. 
Kansas’s history of lockstep imitation of Delaware108 makes it 
unlikely that the state will take affirmative action to enact any of these 
approaches.  But the Kansas judiciary could still conceivably choose to 
incorporate aspects of these approaches into state common law or 
approximate their results by following a Gotham-like course of action109 
that allows for the restriction, but not elimination, of fiduciary duties. 
1. The Revised Uniform Limited Liability Company Act 
In contrast with the Delaware approach, which leaves it to courts to 
define fiduciary duties,110 RULLCA affirmatively establishes fiduciary 
duties.111  RULLCA’s listed fiduciary duties include both the duty of care 
and the duty of loyalty.112  The act further identifies the discrete 
obligations those duties entail and the standards upon which such 
obligations are based.113  While examining how RULLCA defines its 
twin duties of loyalty and care is unnecessary, an examination of the 
law’s limitations on waiver is informative. 
RULLCA allows parties to opt out of . . . [the duty] of care, subject to 
only three substantive limitations.  First, the duty of care may not be 
entirely eliminated.  Second, the standard of care reconstituted by the 
                                                     
 107. Id. at 140–43. 
 108. See Hecker, supra note 94, at 975. 
 109. See supra notes 44–47 and accompanying text. 
 110. See supra Part II.A (discussing the common law of fiduciary duties). 
 111. REVISED UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT § 409 (2006); see also Campbell, supra note 5, at 35–
36, 46–48 (discussing the uniform act’s duty of care and duty of loyalty provisions). 
 112. See REVISED UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT § 409. 
 113. See id. 
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parties may not be “manifestly unreasonable.”  Finally, the 
reconstituted standard of care may not “authorize intentional 
misconduct or knowing violation of [the] law.”114 
RULLCA’s duty of care provisions could be interpreted as maintaining a 
“mandatory core” of fiduciaries; however, any such “core” enunciated in 
RULLCA is generally narrower than most mandatory core proponents 
would prefer to maintain.115  RULLCA is generally more permissive with 
regard to waivers of the duty of loyalty.116  “[T]he only substantive limit 
that RULLCA imposes on the scope of an opt out of the duty of loyalty 
is that the opt out cannot be ‘manifestly unreasonable.’”117  RULLCA 
does allow for the elimination of the duty of loyalty, but it does not go as 
far as the Delaware act, which does not require a reasonableness test for 
a valid waiver.118 
2. The Mandatory Core Approach 
Another approach maintains that some “mandatory core” of fiduciary 
duties should remain unwaivable.119  The original Uniform Limited 
Liability Company Act (ULLCA) takes this approach.120  While the 
revised version allows a broad waiver of the duty of loyalty subject to a 
reasonableness test,121 ULLCA embraces a more restrictive mechanism.  
ULLCA prevents the elimination of the duty of loyalty but allows parties 
to identify specific categories of activities that are exempted.122  As a 
practical matter, the inclusion of a long list of exemptions can effectively 
eliminate the duty of loyalty.123  When engaging in activities unforeseen 
in the LLC agreement, however, a “mandatory core” of fiduciary duties 
would still remain.124 
                                                     
 114. Campbell, supra note 5, at 43 (citations omitted). 
 115. See infra Part II.D.2. 
 116. See REVISED UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT § 110(c)(4); see also Campbell, supra note 5, at 50. 
 117. Campbell, supra note 5, at 50.  An examination of what constitutes “manifestly 
unreasonable” restrictions is not necessary.  Any reasonableness test is inconsistent with the Kansas 
and Delaware statutes.  See infra Part III.A.2. 
 118. See infra Part III.A.2. 
 119. See, e.g., DiMatteo, supra note 39, at 302–04; Miller, supra note 40, at 600–04. 
 120. UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT §§ 103(b)(2)–(3), 409(a)–(c) (1996). 
 121. See supra Part II.D.1. 
 122. UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT § 103(b)(2). 
 123. Cf. Vestal, supra note 5, at 559 (discussing a similar feature in RUPA that allows parties to 
“craft[] a series of limitations that would, when taken together, effectively eliminate the duty of 
loyalty”). 
 124. See UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT §§ 103(b)(2)–(3), 409(a)–(c). 
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Professor Sandra Miller proposes that a small amendment to 
RULLCA could achieve the same result: 
The Mandatory Core approach to fiduciary duties . . . supports the 
approach taken in earlier [drafts of RULLCA] that prohibited the 
complete contractual elimination of duties.  The paradigm suggested 
would permit considerable contractual modification of duties, but 
would do so against the backdrop of well-developed common law 
standards that presuppose a general duty of loyalty. . . . 
 Ultimately, this thesis would support the widespread enactment of 
[RULLCA], but recommend that states modify the wording of [its 
fiduciary duty provisions] to comply with [earlier versions].125 
Kansas courts could conceivably adopt such an approach by interpreting 
the current legislative language in the same way the Delaware Supreme 
Court did in Gotham, the approximate result of which would be a 
preservation of a mandatory core of fiduciary duties.126 
3. Incorporation of Contract Law Principles 
Yet another approach merely incorporates the protections offered 
under contract law principles.  Professor Larry DiMatteo argues that 
Delaware’s contract-based approach necessitates the incorporation of 
contract law principles found in common law: 
Freedom of contract in modern contract law is restricted by immutable 
rules, such as reasonableness, unconscionability, good faith, and fair 
dealing.  Furthermore, specific clauses are highly regulated, including 
limitations of liability, liquidated damages, limitation of remedy, and 
exculpatory clauses.  Because the Delaware Act fails to define freedom 
of contract or provide standards of conduct, the jurisprudence of the 
entire common law of contracts should be used in the interpretation of 
operating agreements.127 
Commentators who suggest this course of action, however, often 
offer only a milquetoast endorsement.128  Both DiMatteo and Miller 
propose that states allowing elimination of fiduciary duties should  
                                                     
 125. Miller, supra note 40, at 603. 
 126. See supra notes 44–48 and accompanying text. 
 127. DiMatteo, supra note 39, at 283. 
 128. See id. at 302; Miller, supra note 40, at 589. 
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establish an overlay of contract law-based protections, but both 
ultimately argue that a mandatory core approach is superior.129 
III. ANALYSIS 
Despite the lack of an express invitation for parties to eliminate 
fiduciary duties in the Kansas LLC act, an examination of the act reveals 
an intent by the legislature to allow elimination.130  This revelation closes 
off the alternative approaches envisioned by commentators and in other 
model codes.131  Kansas and Delaware, then, are similarly positioned—
both must decide on default rules and standards for effective waiver.132  
Delaware precedent is inconsistent on this issue, leaving those issues 
insufficiently answered in that state and providing little persuasive 
authority to guide states that follow the Delaware model.133  Regardless 
of how these questions are ultimately answered in Delaware, an 
examination of both Delaware and Kansas statutes reveals that fiduciary 
duties should apply by default.134  When deciding what constitutes 
sufficient waiver, policy considerations should lead Kansas courts to 
require explicit waiver.135 
A. The Kansas Statute Mandates Enforcement of Fiduciary Duty 
Waivers 
The three main alternatives to Delaware’s approach—the approach 
advanced in RULLCA, the mandatory core approach, and an approach 
that incorporates contract law principles—are unavailable to the Kansas 
judiciary.  The three approaches fail due to their inconsistency with the 
Kansas statute, and their adoption would thus require action by the 
Kansas legislature. 
                                                     
 129. For example, Professor Miller argues: “It is hoped that the jurisdictions permitting the broad 
elimination of fiduciary duties will develop meaningful limitations to curb abusive conduct using 
contractually based concepts.  However, . . . the better approach is to statutorily prohibit the 
complete elimination of fiduciary duties.”  Miller, supra note 40, at 589; see also DiMatteo, supra 
note 39, at 302–03. 
 130. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-76,134 (2007). 
 131. See infra Part III.A.1–3. 
 132. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-76,134; see also infra Part III.B–C. 
 133. See supra Part II.B.1–2. 
 134. See infra Part III.B. 
 135. See infra Part III.B–C. 
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1. The Kansas Statute Allows the Complete Elimination of Fiduciary 
Duties 
The Delaware Supreme Court’s approach in Gotham, at least 
nominally, is not an adoption of the mandatory core approach, but it 
achieves a similar end: the preservation of an immutable core of 
fiduciary duties.136 
Advocates for this approach might argue that the Kansas statute has 
yet to be amended, as Delaware’s statute has, to expressly allow for the 
elimination of fiduciary duties.137  This argument makes an accurate 
point that the Kansas legislature might choose to outsource the labor of 
statute-writing, but it does not outsource its intent.  Put more simply, 
while we might infer from Delaware’s quick legislative response to 
Gotham a consistent intent to allow for the elimination of fiduciary 
duties,138 no similar inference can be made regarding the Kansas 
legislature’s inaction. 
Such an argument is logical, but wholly pedantic.  There is no 
evidence that the esoteric issue of fiduciary duties in alternative entities 
would be the issue that convinced Kansas to break with Delaware—that 
Kansas was willing to follow Delaware’s constant march toward 
unfettered laissez-faire economics but once it stared into the dilated 
pupils of the beast of no fiduciary duties, dared to go no further.  No, by 
consistently outsourcing legislative prerogative to Delaware, the Kansas 
legislature has indicated an approval of Delaware’s trend toward 
liberalization.  Regardless, the intent of the legislature is sufficiently 
evidenced in the pre-2004 version of the law that Kansas uses. 
In fact, Gotham was probably an incorrect decision at the time it was 
made, regardless of any reactive legislative action.139  In Gotham, the 
Delaware Supreme Court focused narrowly on the statute provision that 
allowed only for the “expans[ion] or restrict[ion]” of fiduciary duties.140  
Reading the provision in a vacuum, it is not unreasonable that one would 
conclude it falls short of expressly allowing complete waiver.  A more 
comprehensive approach, which observes and upholds the statute’s clear 
                                                     
 136. See supra Part II.B. 
 137. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-76,134. 
 138. See Steele, supra note 38, at 11–12 (“It is fair to say that the Delaware Supreme Court [in 
Gotham] . . . failed to recognize a clear legislative intent to enable parties to negotiate contractual 
relationships . . . .”). 
 139. See id. 
 140. See Gotham Partners v. Hallwood Realty Partners, 817 A.2d 160, 160 (Del. 2002) (quoting 
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-1101(b) (2002)). 
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policy goals and rules of interpretation,141 reveals the conclusion in 
Gotham was unfounded. 
The Kansas and Delaware statutes both give “maximum effect to the 
principle of freedom of contract and to the enforceability” of the terms of 
LLC agreements.142  Observing a fiduciary duty waiver and choosing not 
to enforce it, as the court did in Gotham, is in contravention of the stated 
policy goal of enforceability.  Furthermore, the statutes’ rules of 
interpretation preclude Gotham’s excessively narrow reading. 
The Kansas Supreme Court arguably shares the desire to maintain 
the enforceability of parties’ agreements.143  While Via Christi did not 
involve the waiver of fiduciary duties, it did evidence a restrictive 
approach to fiduciary duties that favors the enforcement of entity 
agreements.144  As final arbiter, the Kansas Supreme Court may choose 
to extend these enforcement considerations to fiduciary duty waivers.  
Kansas courts, despite dealing with identical statutory language, should 
come to a different conclusion than that reached in Gotham and allow the 
complete waiver of fiduciary duties. 
2. RULLCA-esque Limitations Hamper the Statute’s Policy Goals 
Kansas courts could, however, conceivably choose to impose a 
reasonableness condition on the statute’s allowance of fiduciary duty 
waivers.  This is the approach adopted in most parts of RULLCA, which 
allows fiduciary duties to be completely eliminated so long as their 
elimination is not “manifestly unreasonable.”145  The Kansas statute 
currently allows the elimination of fiduciary duties, but it does not 
expressly propose what parties must do to effectively eliminate fiduciary 
duties.  Therefore, the argument goes, the judiciary is free to imply a 
reasonableness condition on their elimination.  But despite 
acknowledging that fiduciary duties may be eliminated under the statute, 
this approach still runs afoul of the statute’s policy goals.146  In the 
instance that a fiduciary duty waiver is limited by a court as a result of 
                                                     
 141. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-1101(c) (2002), amended by Act effective Aug. 1, 2004, 74 
Del. Laws 612, 613 (2004). 
 142. See id. § 18-1101(b); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-76,134(b). 
 143. See Welch v. Via Christi Health Partners, 133 P.3d 122, 141–42 (Kan. 2006). 
 144. Id. at 142 (“Under the terms of their agreement and Kansas law, Via Christi had the 
authority to orchestrate the merger.”). 
 145. See supra Part II.D.1. 
 146. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-1101(b) (West Supp. 2011); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-
76,134(b). 
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being unreasonable, the enforceability of that waiver is compromised.  
As such, this RULLCA-esque approach does not sufficiently fulfill the 
goal of enforceability.  The Kansas statute allows complete waivers of 
fiduciary duties—yes, even unreasonable ones. 
Of course, unreasonable waivers that frustrate a party’s reasonable 
expectations might still be set aside under the implied covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing.147  Any limitation on waivers, however, must not 
be broader than the statutorily approved covenant.148 
Because fiduciary duties are fully waivable under the Delaware 
model, the model may subject Kansas and Delaware courts to significant 
pressure to adopt some sort of limitation to parties’ broad power to waive 
fiduciary duties, especially when such a waiver results in inequity.  It is 
necessary under the Delaware model that courts exercise restraint and 
tolerate a modicum of inequity to further the goals of enforceability and 
freedom of contract.  While such an approach might seem antithetical to 
the role of modern courts of equity, it is worthwhile to keep in mind that 
at least some of the benefits of a contract-based approach occur outside 
the courtroom—by avoiding a judicial standard of oversight that 
promotes opportunistic lawsuits and post hoc rewriting of agreements.149  
Whether the benefits of this approach outweigh the potential benefits of a 
more interventionist judiciary is ultimately a quantitative question, and 
such a question is difficult to answer.  A proposed benefit of the contract-
based model is the avoidance of litigation, which, because disputes fail 
to arise, is difficult to quantify.150  Ultimately though, this policy 
                                                     
 147. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-1101(c). 
 148. While the Delaware act does embrace the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing as 
an unwaivable principle, the Kansas statute does not.  DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-1101(c); KAN. 
STAT. ANN. § 17-76,134(c).  The import of the covenant’s omission might at first appear 
consequential.  However, Professor Edwin Hecker observes that while 
the [Kansas act] does not codify an obligation of good faith and fair dealing[,] . . . limited 
liability companies are highly contractual in nature, and Kansas case law implies a 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing in all contracts other than those relating to 
employment at will.  Therefore, members and managers of Kansas limited liability 
companies are subject to the obligation of good faith and fair dealing, and it will be 
applied in a manner analogous to partnership law. 
Hecker, supra note 94, at 1003 (footnotes omitted). 
 149. In the context of arguing for narrowly defined fiduciary duties, Ribstein acknowledged the 
moral hazard that broad fiduciary duties may create in some circumstances.  See Ribstein, supra note 
33, at 235–36.  “Where the costs and benefits of ex post litigation are asymmetrical a broad remedy 
gives a party the power to use litigation to extract more from the deal than the parties bargained for.  
In other words, the power to litigate creates a moral hazard.”  Id. at 235. 
 150. See id. at 234–35 (discussing the role of “extralegal incentives” in LLC governance and the 
difficulty of assessing the benefits of fiduciary duties because such benefits “cannot be measured by 
observing conduct in reported cases because extralegal incentives help most in reducing disputes” 
(emphasis added)). 
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question is beyond the reach of the courts because the Kansas and 
Delaware legislatures have provided for complete fiduciary waivers and, 
importantly, their enforcement. 
3. The Incorporation of Contract Law Principles Is Similarly 
Disallowed 
An approach that adopts contract law principles as a proxy for 
fiduciary duties is similarly disallowed.  Professor Larry DiMatteo offers 
a strong rebuttal to the contract-based approach that Delaware has 
adopted: 
The major problem of the contract model of LLCs is that it begins and 
ends at a point that reflects out-of-date contract law theory.  Its premise 
is that the enforcement of [LLC] agreements should begin and end with 
the express terms.  This is the realm of legal formalism and classical 
legal theory.151 
DiMatteo’s observation is incisive.  The Delaware legislature purported 
to adopt a contract-based approach but then refused to adopt an 
application of contract law jurisprudence.152  This atavistic approach 
embraces a form of contract law that no longer exists.153  The 
incorporation of contract law principles offers an attractive, logical 
consistency and may even represent sound policy; however, it fails due 
to a single, but significant, flaw—such an approach is decidedly 
contradictory to the statute. 
If the Delaware act had simply stated a mandate to incorporate 
contract law into LLC governance, we might infer an intent to employ all 
aspects of contract law.  The Delaware act does not do this.  The 
Delaware act not only embraces the freedom of contract but also cites the 
act’s policy goal of giving “maximum effect” to the enforceability of 
LLC agreements.154  The contract law principles that DiMatteo cites, 
such as unconscionability and reasonableness,155 are equitable principles 
that impede enforceability rather than promote it.  It would follow from  
                                                     
 151. DiMatteo, supra note 39, at 308. 
 152. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-1101. 
 153. See DiMatteo, supra note 39, at 308 (explaining that the modern contract-interpretation 
approach is more contextual). 
 154. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-1101(b). 
 155. DiMatteo, supra note 39, at 283. 
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the act’s clear policy objective that contract law principles standing as 
obstacles to enforceability were intended to be superseded. 
Supporters might point to the statute’s inclusion of the implied 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing156 as recognition of the 
applicability of contract law principles,157 but such an assertion assumes 
too much.  Recognizing that some contract law is applicable and useful 
to LLC governance and thus incorporating it does not result in a broader 
adoption of contract law principles.  This is the case in the Delaware 
statute, which includes one contract law principle but not others.  Had the 
Delaware legislature intended to incorporate other contract law principles 
into the law, those principles may have been similarly enunciated.158 
It might be interesting, or possibly painful, to view how courts 
reconcile the rift between common-law contract law—with its overlay of 
duties and protections—with the bare-bones contractual relationship 
envisioned in Kansas and Delaware LLC statutes.159  Courts may be 
expected to enforce bargains under the LLC statute that they would, 
under any other contractual relationship, generally set aside.160  However, 
regardless of the potential difficulties of early application, this bare-
bones contractual approach is the one adopted by the Kansas legislature. 
It is conceivable that Kansas courts might still be seduced into 
incorporating contract law principles in an effort to end-run the statute, 
or a genuine attempt to address new and novel questions with existing 
jurisprudence.  But as such an approach does not effect the intent of the 
legislature, Kansas courts would be ill-advised to adopt it. 
B. Fiduciary Duties Should Serve as Default, but Fully Waivable, Rules 
Concluding that the Kansas statute allows complete waivers of 
fiduciary duties and is unrestricted by a reasonableness test or an 
incorporation of contract law is but one step in the analysis.  The second 
                                                     
 156. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-1101(c). 
 157. DiMatteo, supra note 39, at 295 (“[T]he statute at least implicitly recognizes the 
applicability of the common law of contracts.”). 
 158. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-1101(c) (“[T]he limited liability company agreement may 
not eliminate the implied contractual covenant of good faith and fair dealing.”). 
 159. See id. § 18-1101; KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-76,134 (2007). 
 160. One might imagine a situation where an LLC provision might be unconscionable or, as a 
result of changed circumstances, lead to a frustration of purpose.  How courts will deal with such an 
issue has yet to be seen.  Such circumstances could be rare because such provisions may also run 
afoul of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.  See supra note 147–48 and 
accompanying text.  While the Kansas statute lacks an explicit reference to the covenant, it is 
unlikely that its absence will have much of an effect in practice.  See supra note 148. 
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step requires an answer to an ancillary question: What default rules apply 
when the LLC agreement is silent?  There are two main approaches 
Kansas courts could adopt in answering this question: (1) the pure 
contractarian approach that assumes no default duties except those 
arising out of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing or (2) a 
contract-based approach that uses fiduciary duties as default, but fully 
waivable, rules.  Further examination of the statute and a consideration 
of important policy objectives suggest that the second option is the only 
tenable option under the Kansas statute. 
1. The Kansas Statute Embraces Fiduciary Duties as Default Rules 
Under the pure contractarian approach, no fiduciary duties would be 
assumed unless expressly adopted by the LLC agreement.161  Under this 
regime, the only protection that would apply by default would be the 
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.162 
There are ample and significant reasons for Delaware courts to retreat 
from resolving governance disputes within unincorporated entities 
based upon a focus on status relationships that entails a common law 
scrutiny potentially at odds with statutory policy and the contracting 
parties’ intent.  That potential disconnect is reason enough for 
Delaware courts to refocus on contractual relationships and the 
potential for gap filling through the implied covenant of good faith and 
fair dealing.163 
This may very well be the approach that Delaware will take in the 
future.164 
Language in the statute, however, does not indicate that fiduciary 
duties were intended to be eliminated by default.  The Delaware statute 
states: “To the extent that, at law or in equity, a member or manager or 
other person has duties (including fiduciary duties) . . . [those] duties 
may be expanded or restricted or eliminated by provisions in the limited 
liability company agreement.”165  The import of the statute’s language is 
obvious.  Not only does the statute acknowledge that duties “at law or in 
equity” are applicable to the LLC context, it references fiduciary duties 
explicitly.  In addition to identifying such common-law duties, the statute 
                                                     
 161. See Steele, supra note 38, at 29. 
 162. See id. 
 163. Id. 
 164. See id.; Pileggi, supra note 60. 
 165. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-1101(c) (West Supp. 2011). 
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makes no effort to alter them, instead leaving any alteration to those 
party to the LLC agreement.  The equivalent clause in the Kansas statute 
includes the same prefatory language, so it similarly implies the 
applicability of fiduciary duties as default rules.166 
One possible rebuttal to this interpretation is that the stated policy 
goal of “enforceability” is abridged.167  In truth, this approach embraces 
the freedom of contract by allowing parties to fully waive fiduciary 
duties.  Furthermore, explicit inclusion of fiduciary duties, much like the 
explicit reference to the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, 
implies their consistency with the statute’s policy goals.  Regardless, any 
obstacle to enforceability presented by a fully amendable default rule is 
negligible at best. 
It is important to take a moment to further note the extent to which 
the statute cedes to common law.  The statute includes fiduciary duties 
“[t]o the extent” that they exist “at law or in equity.”168  The statute 
therefore is not creating an implication of broad fiduciary duties applied 
to every member—it is suggesting that those that have such a duty under 
the common law will continue to do so under the statute.  Therefore, if 
we assume Ribstein’s managerial theory of fiduciary duties is correct, a 
nonmanaging, noncontrolling member would still not owe default 
fiduciary duties under the statute.169  It is unnecessary to examine the 
exact types of situations that give rise to fiduciary duties, suffice to say 
that the statute does not purport to edit those common law rules and thus 
implies courts should continue to apply fiduciary duties when 
appropriate under common law.170 
2. Protections in the Pure Contractarian Approach Are Illusory 
A significant shortcoming of the pure contractarian approach is the 
illusory promise that the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing 
can serve as a gap-filler in LLC agreements.171  The truth is that while 
the Delaware LLC act purports to establish the covenant as an immutable  
                                                     
 166. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-76,134(c) (2007). 
 167. See id. § 17-76,134(b). 
 168. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-1101(c). 
 169. See supra notes 62–66 and accompanying text. 
 170. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-1101(c). 
 171. See Steele, supra note 38, at 29 (arguing that the good faith and fair dealing concept is 
“freewheeling”). 
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concept in LLC agreements, in practice, the covenant has been rendered 
almost entirely feckless, at least as applied by Delaware courts.172 
[I]t is clear that “a court cannot and should not use the implied 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing to fill a gap in a contract with an 
implied term unless it is clear from the contract that the parties would 
have agreed to that term had they thought to negotiate the matter.”  
Only rarely invoked successfully, the implied covenant . . . protects the 
spirit of what was actually bargained and negotiated for in the 
contract.173 
The instances where a missing term is firmly ensconced in the bargained-
for terms of the agreement, yet still somehow omitted from its express 
terms, are irreducibly narrow.174 
The covenant’s purported scope further shrinks when a party engages 
in conduct authorized by the LLC agreement.175  “‘[O]ne generally 
cannot base a claim for breach of the implied covenant on conduct 
authorized by the agreement.’”176  The implicit effect of this standard is 
that conduct authorized in the terms of an LLC agreement is presumed to 
be fair and in good faith.  This presumption is not overcome by a 
preponderance of the evidence but only overcome when sufficient facts 
are presented as to create a compelling case that the conduct was in fact 
unfair.177  When exercising an option provided for by the LLC 
agreement, even a grossly negligent and unreasonable party will be 
considerably inoculated from judicial oversight.178  One might argue that 
a party conceivably should be allowed to bargain for such a protection, 
but it is quite another thing to argue that such behavior should be 
tolerated by default. 
Pure contractarians might consider the narrow applicability of the 
covenant to be an advantage as it serves the further goal of limiting 
potentially costly judicial oversight.  It is true that the inefficacy of the 
covenant alone is not in itself grounds to dismiss the pure contractarian 
approach.  However, the pure contractarian’s envisioned role of the 
                                                     
 172. See supra Part II.B.2 (discussing the low level of protection offered by Delaware courts). 
 173. Fisk Ventures v. Segal, No. 3017-CC, 2008 WL 1961156, at *10 (Del. Ch. May 7, 2008) 
(internal footnotes omitted). 
 174. But see O’Tool v. Genmar Holdings, 387 F.3d 1188, 1195–98 (10th Cir. 2004) (discussing a 
plaintiff that was denied fair opportunity to benefit from bargained-for provisions in the contract). 
 175. See Nemec v. Shrader, 991 A.2d 1120, 1125–26 (Del. 2010). 
 176. Id. (quoting Dunlap v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 878 A.2d 434, 441 (Del. 2005)). 
 177. Id. at 1126 n.16. 
 178. See id. at 1126. 
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covenant as a gap-filler is a bit optimistic for a covenant that has yet to 
actually succeed in filling any gaps in LLC agreements.179 
The covenant also fails for a more fundamental reason.  The 
purported value of the covenant is its protection of parties’ reasonable 
expectations,180 but the nature of LLCs makes this an ineffective tool for 
doing so.  Unlike most contracts, the formation of an LLC envisions joint 
and sustained enterprise.181  When people form an LLC, they agree “to 
advance the collective interest and not [their] short term individual 
interest.”182  This ongoing nature of an LLC necessitates a view that 
allows for adaptability to changed circumstances.183  Despite the 
covenant’s protection of reasonable expectations,184 it is impossible that 
parties would have any expectations at all with regard to unforeseen 
circumstances, which, by their nature, were unexpected.  Of course, 
experienced agreement drafters can succeed in protecting themselves 
against unforeseen circumstances by crafting adaptable or broadly 
applicable safeguards, such as exit provisions, managerial audits and 
oversight, and buy-out provisions.  The contract-based approach of 
Delaware and Kansas allows parties to do this, but the approach should 
not impute this level of sophistication on all aspiring LLC members.  The 
adaptability of fiduciary duties to changing circumstances promotes their 
use as default, but fully waivable, rules.185 
3. Default Fiduciary Duties Better Protect Parties’ Expectations 
Historical context should play a limited role in deciding the best 
policy going forward.  It is, however, still relevant, inasmuch as it affects 
the expectations of the parties.  That fiduciary duties have historically 
applied by default186 is important in that it affects parties’ expectations 
with regard to the existence of such duties.  Humorously, while the pure 
contractarian approach would prefer no default assumption of the 
applicability of fiduciary duties,187 the adoption of the implied covenant 
                                                     
 179. See supra notes 90–92 and accompanying text. 
 180. See E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Pressman, 679 A.2d 436, 443 (Del. 1996). 
 181. Cf. Vestal, supra note 5, at 527 (discussing formation in the context of partnerships). 
 182. Id. (discussing the nature of partnerships). 
 183. Cf. id. at 540 (“The only way to accommodate successfully the unforeseen variations either 
in a given partnership or in partnerships generally is to allow for accommodation after the fact.”). 
 184. See Pressman, 679 A.2d at 443. 
 185. See Vestal, supra note 5, at 540–41 (discussing the “flexibility and adaptability” of 
fiduciary duties). 
 186. See supra Part II.A. 
 187. See supra notes 161–73 and accompanying text. 
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of good faith and fair dealing could conceivably serve to incorporate 
traditional fiduciary duties.  The covenant protects the “reasonable 
expectations” of the parties;188 however, it is conceivable that the parties 
to an LLC agreement might reasonably expect that their fellow members 
are bound by the most fundamental duties that have governed like parties 
for decades: traditional fiduciary duties.189  Such a line of reasoning 
appears facetious, but it does augur an important issue to consider in 
crafting the best policy—that fiduciary duties are expected. 
The formation of a business envisions an ongoing relationship.190  
Parties are rarely successful at hammering out all the necessary 
provisions to govern such a relationship in advance, so parties generally 
provide their colleagues some level of discretion by which to respond to 
changing circumstances.191  It is the nature of this discretion that 
promotes the use of fiduciary duties.192  While Ribstein argues for the 
right of parties to waive fiduciary duties, he also recognizes the 
efficiency-enhancing aspects of accompanying fiduciary duties with the 
delegation of broad discretionary power.193  When one affords a fellow 
member a certain amount of managerial discretion, it should be expected 
that she exercise that discretion within long-established norms.  The 
presumption that such a member’s actions are bound by considerations of 
reasonableness and fairness is one that has existed throughout the 
twentieth century.194  This presumption should be maintained in LLC 
governance. 
4. Forcing Waiver Preserves LLCs’ Accessibility 
A major benefit of the contract-based approach is the flexibility it 
provides.195  LLCs can be customized to fit the unique requirements of 
each individual venture by allowing LLC members a boundless 
environment in which to innovate.196  However, it is important to 
acknowledge that flexibility can damage another attractive attribute of 
                                                     
 188. Pressman, 679 A.2d at 443. 
 189. See supra Part II.A. 
 190. Vestal, supra note 5, at 527. 
 191. See Ribstein, supra note 33, at 212. 
 192. See id. 
 193. See id. 
 194. See supra Part II.A. 
 195. 1 RIBSTEIN & KEATINGE, supra note 27, § 3:3 (“[T]he LLC form offers enhanced flexibility 
that . . . is an appropriate alternative to incorporation or limited partnership for some firms.”). 
 196. See id. 
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LLCs—accessibility.  LLCs are created with relative ease and without 
the formality that generally accompanies forming and operating 
corporations.197  But accessibility is abridged when the landscape of 
LLCs is littered with potential legal pitfalls.  That is not to say that 
accessibility and flexibility are dueling objectives.  Measures that 
preserve the accessibility of LLCs without damaging their flexibility are 
no-brainers.  The adoption of fiduciary duties as default, fully waivable 
rules is one such measure. 
An analogy to bumper bowling is apt.  Inexperienced bowlers may 
decide that bumper bowling, rather than conventional bowling, is the 
most suitable game for them.  Those inexperienced bowlers can play to 
their heart’s content without the risk of a gutter ball ruining their fun.  
The existence of bumper bowling, however, does not prevent more 
experienced bowlers from engaging in the sport sans bumpers.  A simple 
flick of the wrist converts a bumpered lane into a conventional bowling 
lane.  Furthermore, any trip to a bowling alley, even on Disco Thursdays, 
will reveal bumper bowlers and conventional bowlers cohabitating 
without issue. 
In case the analogy was not clear enough, fiduciary duties as default, 
fully waivable rules provide experienced parties with the means to craft 
the agreement they wish without imperiling less experienced parties with 
the “gutter balls” that discourage their participation.  This approach 
maintains flexibility by allowing parties that wish to fully eliminate 
fiduciary duties to do so, while maintaining an accessible, hazard-free 
environment for LLC virgins. 
The legally inexperienced should be a consideration in policy 
decisions for both Kansas and Delaware, but this consideration is 
especially important in Kansas.  Delaware has created an industry in the 
state by attracting businesspeople from around the country to incorporate 
under its unrestrained business laws.198  There is a question, however, 
whether Kansas should choose to emulate such an approach.  In contrast 
to the state-hopping, legally sophisticated Delaware investor, Kansas 
should be mindful of an equally important constituent—the middle-
income entrepreneur.  While a small business’s capitalization may be 
smaller, the stakes can be larger when that owner relies on the business 
for her livelihood.  Kansas courts should be aware that not every 
                                                     
 197. See Ribstein, supra note 15, 11–12 (noting the combination of corporate-type limited 
liability with more simple partnership-type management and taxation). 
 198. “More than 50% of all publicly-traded companies in the United States including 63% of the 
Fortune 500 have chosen Delaware as their legal home.”  About Agency, DEL. DIV. OF CORPS., 
http://corp.delaware.gov/aboutagency.shtml (last visited Jan. 6, 2011). 
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investor–manager relationship is one envisioned by the attorneys of 
venture capitalists.  Kansas courts should, within the framework adopted 
by the legislature, consider how their decisions may affect less-
sophisticated, but no less important, small business owners.  The 
equitable principles that govern traditional fiduciary duties best protect 
this important constituent. 
LegalZoom, an online service offering legal documents, provides 
LLC formation services.199  After filling out a “simple online 
questionnaire,” LegalZoom creates your LLC documents and files them 
with the appropriate secretary of state.200  This is a positive development.  
If a person decides to turn her affinity for crafts into a part-time business 
enterprise, she should not be forced to retain counsel to do so.  Joining 
with a sister-in-law to sell aromatic candles at the renaissance fair is not 
the sort of endeavor that requires vociferous bargaining across a 
conference table.  The unnecessary abridgment of LLCs’ accessibility 
discourages this kind of participation.  Even if this aspiring candle-maker 
is in the minority, it is a minority that deserves protection. 
That is not to say that Kansas should not seek to attract investors 
from outside the state; establishing fiduciary duties as default rules does 
not discourage the legally sophisticated.  Experienced parties, in line 
with the Kansas statute,201 are fully free to waive fiduciary duties.  
Requiring waiver of fiduciary duties enables first-time entrepreneurs to 
form an LLC without the additional risk of falling prey to legal chicanery 
by their more experienced counterparts.  This necessary protection, 
however, in no way impedes those that prefer to opt out. 
C. Fiduciary Duty Waivers Must Be Explicit 
The applicability of fiduciary duties as waivable, default rules raises 
an additional question: What is required to waive fiduciary duties?  
Recent Delaware cases suggest that fiduciary duties can be waived by 
incorporating LLC terms that are inconsistent with traditional fiduciary 
duties.202  Such an approach creates an unclear standard, subjects parties 
to perilous trap-door agreements, and fails to provide sufficient notice to 
                                                     
 199. LLC Formation & Business Incorporation Services, LEGALZOOM, http://www.legal 
zoom.com/limited-liability-company/limited-liability-company-overview.html (last visited Jan. 24, 
2011). 
 200. Id. 
 201. See supra Part III.A. 
 202. See, e.g., Related Westpac LLC v. JER Snowmass LLC, No. 5001-VCS, 2010 WL 
2929708, at *8 (Del. Ch. July 23, 2010). 
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parties to the LLC agreement.  The superior policy approach is to require 
an explicit waiver of fiduciary duties.  This clear standard aids in the 
process of contract drafting by forcing parties to negotiate their business 
relationship in a manner that places all parties on notice. 
1. Mere Inconsistency Is Not Enough 
In its recent Related Westpac decision, the Delaware Court of 
Chancery established that fiduciary duties can be waived when the terms 
of the LLC agreement are inconsistent with the application of fiduciary 
duties.203  The case is unpublished, and it is unclear whether its approach 
will be applied more broadly.  What is clear is that such a standard 
produces uncertain results and serves as a questionable guide for 
attorneys. 
In Related Westpac, an express exclusion of one LLC member from 
a reasonableness limitation was treated as a broad waiver of fiduciary 
duties.204  The court correctly identified an LLC agreement provision 
allowing a member to unreasonably refuse capital calls as inconsistent 
with traditional fiduciary duties.205  However, an exemption from a 
fiduciary duty standard fails to provide any standard at all.  The capital-
call provision in Related Westpac would reasonably be interpreted to 
allow a member to act unreasonably, but it does not necessarily follow 
that he may also act in bad faith or otherwise breach the duty of loyalty.  
Furthermore, an exception for unreasonable behavior fails to completely 
eliminate the duty of care.  Would, for example, an exception for 
unreasonable behavior allow a member to act recklessly?  Related 
Westpac shows that even minor provisions narrowly abridging fiduciary 
duties might have the effect of waiving fiduciary duties more broadly.206  
The plaintiff in the case was on notice that his fellow member was 
unbound by a reasonableness restriction in refusing capital calls, but it is 
unlikely that he could have foreseen that his colleague might be 
inoculated against judicial oversight on broader grounds. 
As support for the contract-based approach to unincorporated 
entities, proponents often cite the decreased likelihood of judicial 
intervention in the terms of the LLC agreement.207  This argument is 
                                                     
 203. Id. at *8; see also supra Part II.B.1.b. 
 204. See Related Westpac, 2010 WL 2929708, at *8; see also Pileggi, supra note 70. 
 205. See id. 
 206. See id. 
 207. See Larry E. Ribstein, Fiduciary Duty Contracts in Unincorporated Firms, 54 WASH. & 
LEE L. REV. 537, 550 (1997) (discussing the inefficiency and costs of enforcing fiduciary duties 
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valid; members of the judiciary should not seek to solve the controversy 
in front of them without adequate consideration as to how their decision 
might affect the behavior of parties outside their courtroom.  The Related 
Westpac approach squanders the potential efficiency-enhancing aspects 
of the contract-based approach by establishing a nebulous standard of 
review that creates uncertainty in judicial oversight.  The smarter 
approach is to adopt a clear standard that requires explicit waiver of 
fiduciary duties.  Not only does explicit waiver limit the uncertainty of 
judicial oversight, it also provides a clear standard by which parties can 
craft LLC agreements. 
Such an approach does not impair the statute’s goals of 
enforceability.208  To the contrary, express terms in an LLC agreement 
that are inconsistent with fiduciary duties would be fully enforceable.  
However, such express terms should only amend fiduciary duties to the 
extent that the term is inconsistent with them and not purport to waive 
fiduciary duties broadly.  In Related Westpac, this approach would still 
respect the defendant’s bargained-for right to unreasonably refuse capital 
calls, but it would not assume that a broad waiver was intended when 
there was no expression of such. 
2. Reducing Uncertainty in the Business Relationship 
Inherent in the contract-based approach is the assumption that the 
terms of an LLC agreement are negotiated for, and thus judges should be 
reluctant to intervene and set aside contractual rights and duties.209  The 
reality of LLC agreement negotiations does not bear out this 
presumption.210  Surveys suggest that LLC agreements are generally 
negotiated unilaterally by one party as opposed to multiple equally 
powerful parties.211  The Kansas and Delaware statutes do little to 
address this inequity. 
However, when faced with a decision of whether to impose the 
requirement of an express waiver upon the more sophisticated parties to 
an agreement, the answer is obvious.  In the very least, the risks are 
disclosed to each party and an additional datum is presented by which 
                                                                                                                       
through litigation). 
 208. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-1101(b) (West Supp. 2011). 
 209. See Miller, supra note 40, at 614 (“A purely contractarian paradigm presupposes the 
existence of a fair and level contractual playing field, a well-negotiated LLC agreement, and a legal 
community of practitioners and courts that are well-trained in fiduciary duties.”). 
 210. See id. at 583–86 (discussing the results of a survey of attorneys representing both majority 
and minority LLC investors). 
 211. See id.; see also DiMatteo, supra note 39, at 283 (discussing Miller’s survey). 
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parties may conclude whether to form an LLC.  This reduces uncertainty 
over the long run because it forces the parties to hammer out their 
relationship before its formation, rather than in post hoc disputes.  It 
might be exceedingly optimistic to expect such a process to head off 
litigation early, but in some circumstances, it certainly has the potential 
to do so.  Regardless of whether such a standard results in decreased 
litigation, there is no downside to forcing parties to engage in the 
conversation during the formation of the business, thereby negotiating 
their respective duties and amending their expectations.  Explicit waiver 
accomplishes just this. 
3. Explicit Waivers Best Provide Notice 
The pure contractarian assertion that viewing LLC members through 
the lens of a contractual relationship is the best way to uphold the 
contracting parties’ intent is not universally correct.212  Such an argument 
is based on the assumption that the parties’ intent is most accurately 
evidenced in the express terms of the LLC agreement.  But because 
disputes are generally the result of unintended results, the parties’ intent 
is hardly provided for by express terms of the contract.213  The fact that 
parties to an agreement are, by default, bound by some basic duties helps 
decrease the risk that a seemingly innocuous agreement provision may 
become a tool by which a member acting in bad faith might inflict harm 
upon fellow members. 
Of course, the beauty of fiduciary duties serving as default, but 
waivable, rules is that parties that disagree with this contention are free 
to expressly waive these default rules, but they must be so waived.  
Legally sophisticated members should be encouraged to protect their 
interests and avoid litigation by carefully crafting their own set of rules 
contrary to these default gap-fillers, but they may not do so at the 
expense of less-sophisticated counterparts. 
The problem with the Related Westpac approach is that such a 
standard provides no indication on the LLC agreement’s face that basic 
concepts of fairness and equity are inapplicable.214  While the end result 
in an agreement that explicitly waives traditional fiduciary duties might 
                                                     
 212. Cf. Vestal, supra note 5, at 540 (discussing parties’ ability to predict “unforeseen 
variations” in the partnership context). 
 213. Cf. id. (“The only way to accommodate successfully the unforeseen variations either in a 
given partnership or in partnerships generally is to allow for accommodation after the fact.  This is 
precisely the virtue of the present, fiduciary-based regime.”). 
 214. See supra notes 204–06 and accompanying text. 
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still be the abandonment of those duties, the important difference is that 
this approach puts all parties on notice.  Such an approach is justifiable in 
that it places the legal burden on the party most capable of bearing it.  
The alternative—forcing action upon the less-sophisticated members that 
may be insufficiently aware of their exposure to risk—is an approach 
that is far more likely to lead to inequity. 
It is of course possible that inexperienced players might observe the 
waiver but be unaware of its import.  This is a reasonable criticism.  
Because the statute is silent on the question of how to waive fiduciary 
duties,215 the judiciary might be free to implement standards of 
disclosure.  Following the promulgation of RULLCA, Professor 
Rutheford Campbell suggested effective waiver should require “a 
prominent, concise statement in plain English on the outside front cover 
page of the operating agreement describing and explaining the essential 
terms of the opt-out and the reformulat[ion]” of the applicable duty.216  
Such a strong disclosure requirement is good policy, but there is a 
question of whether such a policy is available under the Kansas and 
Delaware statutes.217  In the instance that fiduciary duties are waived but 
this lofty standard is not met, such a waiver would be unenforceable; this 
might run afoul of the statute’s goal of enforceability.218  However, given 
the limited leeway afforded by the Kansas statute, requiring an explicit 
waiver is still superior to a standard that forces parties, especially 
unsophisticated ones, to decode a series of provisions that may or may 
not be deemed by a court as inconsistent with fiduciary duties.  Kansas 
should adopt a policy that rewards adequate disclosure instead of 
promoting the use of carefully crafted trap-door agreements. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Much has been made of Delaware’s move to a contract-based 
approach to unincorporated entities.219  The trend in Delaware, however, 
is but a more pronounced case of the same national trend, evidenced 
partially in the promulgation of uniform codes.  From UPA to RUPA, 
ULLCA to RULLCA, the country has seen a move toward a more 
                                                     
 215. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-1101 (West Supp. 2011); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-76,134 
(2007). 
 216. Campbell, supra note 5, at 44 (making the proposal in reference to standard of care 
waivers); see also id. at 52 (making a similar proposal for the duty of loyalty). 
 217. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-1101; KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-76,134. 
 218. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-1101(b); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-76,134(b). 
 219. See supra Part II.B. 
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liberalized view of fiduciary duties and parties’ ability to contractually 
modify them.220  The task at hand for Kansas and Delaware courts, 
however, is ultimately far narrower in scope because both Kansas and 
Delaware statutes require that fiduciary duty waivers be enforced.221 
There will likely be significant growing pains associated with the 
reorientation around this contractarian right, but courts should observe 
the statute’s mandate to cede the terms of fiduciary relationships to 
private parties.  The benefits advanced by proponents of the contract-
based approach are often seen outside of the courtroom; such benefits 
require the restraint of the judiciary.  Thus, courts should focus their 
efforts on creating a coherent approach within the framework of the 
statute.  The default nature of fiduciary duties is not superseded by the 
statute,222 and so courts should, absent waiver, continue to employ 
fiduciary duties when they are deemed appropriate under the common 
law.  In addition to the statutory language approving the use of fiduciary 
duties as default, but waivable, rules, are the policy objectives advanced 
by such an approach.  These default rules serve to protect the 
expectations of the parties and maintain the accessible quality of LLCs.  
Delaware may serve as a comfortable haven for business interests.223  
However, courts in that state and Kansas should recognize that waivable 
defaults do not abridge those interests and further serve the goal of 
protecting the expectations of less-experienced, less-represented parties. 
The standard for effective waiver is one instance where the courts are 
left with more leeway to innovate.  Delaware’s recent cases indicate a 
tolerance for the elimination of fiduciary duties even in cases where full 
waiver is not expressly adopted.  Such a standard of judicial oversight 
creates uncertainty and thereby wastes the potential efficiency-enhancing 
benefits of the contract-based approach.  Requiring explicit waiver, in 
contrast, serves to clarify the business relationship and provides 
important notice. 
As in Gotham, some courts might be reluctant to embrace the 
contract-based approach;224 however, because such an approach is 
mandated by Delaware law, courts should work to develop cohesive and 
consistent jurisprudence within that framework.  Such jurisprudence 
should give effect to the legislation’s intent and observe important policy 
                                                     
 220. See sources cited supra note 5. 
 221. See supra Part III.A.1. 
 222. See supra Part III.B.1. 
 223. See About Agency, supra note 198. 
 224. See supra Part II.B. 
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considerations by maintaining fiduciary duties as default, fully waivable 
rules. 
